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CIVIL PROCEDURE-SUPPLEMENTAL
JURISDICTION AND THE EXPANSION OF THE
INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION REQUIREMENT-GLOBAL NAPS,
INC. V VERIZON NEW ENGLAND, INC., 603 F.3D 71

(1ST CIR. 2010)
In order for a United States federal district court to exercise
jurisdiction over claims brought by a plaintiff, the claims must either be of
sufficient federal substance, or be based on diversity between the parties
with an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.1 When the parties are
in federal court based on a federal question, the court's supplemental
jurisdiction extends to other non-federal compulsory counterclaims that a
defendant is required to bring, and the court may exercise jurisdiction over
so called "permissive counterclaims" so long as they form part of the same
Article III case or controversy as the original claim.2 In GlobalNAPs, Inc.
v. Verizon New England,Inc.,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit addressed whether a federal court could properly exercise
jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim that did not have its own
independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction, but rather was related to
another counterclaim raised by the defendant.4 The court held that it could
properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the defendant's
counterclaim because according to the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 the
jurisdictional limit for counterclaims is the Article III case or controversy

I

See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil

actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."); 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(1)-(3) (2006) (outlining amount in controversy and diversity requirements).
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006) (describing court's supplemental jurisdiction where
original jurisdiction is based on federal law). This section allows federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction over claims that form part of the same Article III case or controversy and includes
"claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties." Id. The court has the
discretion not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the claim raises a "complex
issue of State law," the claim "substantially predominates" over the anchor claim brought under
the court's original jurisdiction, the other claims have been dismissed, or for "other compelling
reasons." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(4) (2006); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)(A) (mandating
pleadings state counterclaims arising out of same "transaction or occurrence" of plaintiff's claim);
FED. R. CIv. P. 13(b) (granting court discretion over non-compulsory counterclaims). See
generally U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (granting federal jurisdiction to cases and controversies
arising under United States Constitution, laws, and treaties).
3 603 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2010).
4 Id. at 85-86 (outlining issues on appeal).
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standard.5
Appellant Global NAPs, Inc. ("GNAP") and appellee Verizon New
England, Inc. ("Verizon") disagreed about an interconnectivity agreement
("ICA") they entered into in 2002 that determined how payments would be
made to each company regarding charges for Internet service provider
("ISP") traffic.6 Later in 2002, as a result of arbitration, the Massachusetts
Department of Technology and Energy (DTE) ordered a new agreement
whereby GNAP would have to pay Verizon for ISPs located outside of the
local calling area. Following that decision, GNAP filed, and lost, a series
of lawsuits against Verizon attempting to avoid enforcement of the new
ICA.8 In addition to the many lawsuits it already had pending against
Verizon, GNAP also filed suit in 2005 seeking payment for charges GNAP
claimed Verizon owed it under the ICA. 9 Verizon subsequently filed a
compulsory counterclaim for breach of contract and sought recovery of
access charges Verizon claimed it was owed under the 2002 ICA.10 After

5 Id. at 86-87. The court made clear that it has jurisdiction regardless of whether a claim is
compulsory or permissive because 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) is broad and does not distinguish between
permissive and compulsory claims. See id. at 85; see also id. at 77 (noting § 1367(a) allows
"jurisdiction over compulsory and at least some permissive counterclaims").
6 Id. at 78.
A disagreement arose over what was actually owed under the ICA. Id.

According to the agreement, Verizon was to pay a reciprocal fee to GNAP for any local "calls"
that were generated through GNAP's ISPs and GNAP was to pay Verizon for any long distance
"calls." Id. GNAP was exploiting this agreement by issuing their ISP customers local telephone
numbers even though they were outside of the calling area. Id. This tactic generated substantial
fees owed from Verizon through the reciprocal fee agreement of the ICA because the calls
showed up as local calls. Id.
7 Id. The agreement took effect in early 2003 and Verizon immediately began to bill GNAP.
Id. at79.
8 See, e.g., Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 24-25 (1st Cir.
2007) (upholding district court's termination of injunction against Verizon and release of $16
million in security); Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 444 F.3d 59, 75 (1st Cir.
2006) (holding state authority not preempted by FCC order where FCC admits preemption issue
is ambiguous); Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 396 F.3d 16, 28 (1st Cir. 2005)
(affirming lower court's decision to uphold ICA); Global NAPs, Inc. v. Mass. Dep't of
Telecomms. & Energy, 427 F.3d 34, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding Massachusetts not bound by
Rhode Island court's decision on identical ICA).
9 Global NAPs, Inc., 603 F.3d at 79 (stating GNAP was seeking its reciprocal fees under the
agreement). This case was consolidated with GNAP's prior case claiming federal preemption of
the state's judgment enforcing the ICA. Id. (noting procedural posture of case).
10 Id. The court ruled against GNAP, thereby leaving Verizon's counterclaim still pending.
Id. In late 2006, shortly after the ruling, discovery on Verizon's counterclaim commenced. Id.
In 2007, GNAP "argued for the first time" that Verizon's counterclaim had to be reviewed by the
State DTE prior to going to federal court, but that argument was rejected by the district court. Id.
Subsequently, the FCC issued a new remand order regarding the Telecommunications Act of
1996, of which the ICA between Verizon and GNAP was bound. Id. GNAP again tried to make
the argument that the federal court was preempted from hearing Verizon's counterclaim and the
district court again rejected their argument. Id. See generally Federal Telecommunications Act
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finding that the district court had jurisdiction to enforce the ICA, the court
next found that jurisdiction was proper over the first count of Verizon's
counterclaims based on supplemental jurisdiction. 11
The district court addressed Verizon's counterclaim in 2008 and
held that, under the ICA, GNAP owed Verizon $57,716,714.12 Prior to this
judgment, Verizon, concerned about GNAP's ability to pay, attached
GNAP's assets and amended its counterclaim to assert two additional
claims.13 Count two asserted that GNAP had commingled funds, and count14
three claimed "alter ego liability and disregard of the corporate form."
Count three required joining additional parties to the lawsuit: Global NAPs
New Hampshire, Global NAPs Networks, Global NAPs Realty, Ferrous, a
holding
company, and Frank Gangi "[the] founder and sole shareholder of
F ,,15
Ferrous.
After an unsuccessful attempt by GNAP to have counts two
and three dismissed as permissive counterclaims, the court entered a default
judgment for Verizon based on GNAP's discovery violations and held all
of the defendants jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the
judgment. 16 On appeal, the First Circuit considered whether Verizon's
counterclaims were permissive, and if so, whether they required an
independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. 17
Prior to the 1990 enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, district courts
addressed compulsory and permissive counterclaims through what was
deemed pendent and ancillary jurisdiction."8 While pendent jurisdiction
of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 252 (2008) (codifying standards for arbitration agreements between
common carriers).
11See Global NAPs, Inc., 603 F.3d at 85 (noting "Verizon's counterclaim is more than
sufficiently related to GNAPs' complaint"). The court refused to consider whether original
jurisdiction is proper over count one. Id. at 84 n. 15.
12 See id. at 80 (discussing procedural posture of case). The court arrived at this amount by
having the parties determine how many minutes were outstanding, how many of those minutes
were local calls, what rate those minutes should be charged, and what interest, if any, was owed.
Id.

13 Id. Verizon became concerned after attaching GNAP's assets and learning there was less
than one million dollars in the company's name. Id. In addition, while Verizon's counterclaims
were pending, GNAP was not cooperating with the discovery ordered by the court. Id. at 81.
Further, the court and Verizon became aware of a matter pending in Connecticut where the court
there found substantial spoliation of the evidence by GNAP in a similar action. Id. (citing S. New
England Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 82, 90-95 (D. Conn. 2008)).
14 See Global NAPs, Inc., 603 F.3d at 80 (enumerating Verizon's counterclaims).
15 Id. GNAP New Hampshire handles the financial interests of GNAP, GNAP Networks

manages the company's infrastructure, and GNAP Realty handles the property transactions of the
company including holding property and leases. Id.
16 See Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England Inc., 603 F.3d 71, 81 (1st Cir. 2010)
(qualifying judgment in favor of Verizon). GNAP subsequently appealed. Id.
17 See id. at 83 (outlining jurisdictional issues of case).
18 See William A. Fletcher, "Common Nucleus of Operative Fact" and Defensive Set-Off.
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over plaintiffs' claims was generally accepted in federal court, an exercise
of ancillary jurisdiction required separate examination. 19 After enaction of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts were unsure about their
jurisdiction regarding the ability of one party to join additional parties
under so-called "pendent-party jurisdiction." 20 In UnitedMine Workers v.
Gibbs21 the United States Supreme Court finally established some ground
rules to clear up confusion among the circuit courts regarding supplemental
jurisdiction.2 2 The Court in Gibbs gave federal courts jurisdiction over
federal and state claims that "derive from a common nucleus of operative
Beyond the Gibbs Test, 74 IND. L.J. 171, 174-75 (1998) (explaining origins of pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction); Wendy C. Perdue, Finley v. United States: Unstringing Pendent
Jurisdiction, 76 VA. L. REV. 539, 541-51 (1990) (discussing judge-made ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction); 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3523
(3d ed. 2010) (observing historical use of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction). Traditionally
pendent jurisdiction was used to describe state law claims brought by a plaintiff in addition to
their federal claim, and ancillary jurisdiction was used to describe state law claims brought by a
party other than the plaintiff. Id.; see also Perdue, supra at 541 (discussing same). In 1933 the
United States Supreme Court began to define pendent jurisdiction in the case of Hum v. Ours/er,
and held jurisdiction over a non-federal claim is proper where "two distinct grounds in support of
a single cause of action are alleged, one only of which presents a federal question." 289 U.S. 238,
246 (1933), overruled by United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). The Court went
on to distinguish improper jurisdiction as "where two separate and distinct causes of action are
alleged, one only of which is federal in character." Id.; see also Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 722-26 (citing
Hum and overturning this portion of the opinion as "unnecessarily grudging"); WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra at § 3523 (discussing Hum and noting question was superseded by Gibbs).
19 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 18, at § 3523 (tracing separate body of case law in this
area). The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of ancillary jurisdiction in the
seminal case of Afoore v. New York Cotton Exchange, exercising jurisdiction over a compulsory
counterclaim by the defendant for injunctive relief after dismissing the plaintiffs claim, stating,
"the facts relied upon by the plaintiff rarely, if ever, are, in all particulars, the same as those
constituting the defendant's counterclaim." Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610
(1926); see also Perdue, supra note 18, at 544 (citing Court's reason for exercising jurisdiction in
Afoore as relatedness between claim and counterclaim). The Court defined "transaction" as "a
word of flexible meaning ...[that] may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not
so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship." Moore,
270 U.S. at 610.
20 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 18, at § 3523 (concluding adoption of the Federal Rules
expanded supplemental jurisdiction through joinder). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)-(b)
(defining compulsory and permissive counterclaims respectively); FED. R. CIV. P. 13(h) ("Rules
19 and 20 govern the addition of a person as a party to a counterclaim or crossclaim."); FED. R.
CIV. P. 20(a)(2).
Persons ...may be joined in one action as defendants if: any right to relief is asserted
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and any question
of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2).
21 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
22 See id at 725 (expanding pendent jurisdiction definition).
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fact." 23 Gibbs primarily dealt with the issue of pendent jurisdiction but
some commentators
suggest the decision encompasses ancillary jurisdiction
24
as well.
While this proposition may seem obvious today, many courts
struggled with Gibbs' breadth in the wake of that landmark decision.25 In
fact, several decisions following this seminal case rejected applying the
Gibbs formulation to determine proper jurisdiction in certain instances. 26
Adding to the confusion of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction was whether
permissive counterclaims, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(b),
came in under the court's supplemental jurisdiction. 27 While several courts

23

Id. The Court defined this statement by saying that once a federal court has jurisdiction

based on a federal claim of sufficient substance under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, a
closely related state law claim may also be heard by the court if the claims "considered without
regard to their federal or state character ... are such that [they] would ordinarily be expected to
[be tried] . . . in one judicial proceeding." Id. The Gibbs Court, however, did not mandate that

these claims be heard, but instead gave federal courts discretion to hear such claims based on
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." Id. at 726.
24 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 18, § 3523 (noting Gibbs addressed pendent jurisdiction
but clearly expanded supplemental jurisdiction to claims by non-plaintiffs).

See Patrick D. Murphy, A Federal Practitioner'sGuide to Supplemental Jurisdiction
Under 28 US.C. § 1367, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 973, 980 (1995) (opining pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction well established but pendent party jurisdiction not).
26 See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 553-54 (1989), superseded by statute,
28 U.S.C.
§ 1367, as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005)
(declining jurisdiction over state law claims against separate defendants without specific
congressional authorization); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74
(1978), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (declining jurisdiction over plaintiff's amended
complaint asserting claim against third-party defendant); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 -15
(1976), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (declining jurisdiction over plaintiff's attempt to join
additional party and assert state-law claim). In these cases the U.S. Supreme Court specifically
rejected the use of the Gibbs formulation to determine whether jurisdiction was proper over
pendent-party claims. See Murphy, supra note 25, at 986. Commentators believe that Finley
particularly presented a perfect fit for pendent jurisdiction: first the plaintiff was properly in
federal court under the Federal Tort Claims Act with her claims against the United States, second
plaintiff's state law claims against the state government arose out of the same common nucleus of
operative fact, the plane crash. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 18, at § 3523 ("Finley presented
an overwhelming case for supplemental jurisdiction because the claim against the United States
invoked exclusive federal jurisdiction"); Murphy, supra note 25, at 984 (observing Finley
presented a "strong case for recognizing pendent-party jurisdiction."); Perdue, supra note 18, at
551-52 (notingAldingeropened the door for these types of pendent claims).
27 See Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 988-89 (3d Cir. 1984)
(exercising jurisdiction over permissive counterclaim based on ancillary jurisdiction, not
defensive "set-off' exception); McCaffrey v. Rex Motor Transp., Inc., 672 F.2d 246, 248 (1st Cir.
1982) (stating permissive counterclaims require independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction);
United States v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077, 1080 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding permissive
counterclaims require "independent jurisdictional grounds").
Defensive "set off' is a
counterclaim brought by a defendant that allows a defendant to reduce the size of plaintiffs
25
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focused on the language of 13(a) regarding the "same transaction or
occurrence" to distinguish between compulsory and permissive, other
courts began to move away from this trend. 28
Because of the perplexity of this judge-made law, in 1990,
Congress acted to explain and codify Gibbs with the enactment of 28
U.S.C. § 1367.29 The inclusion of pendent, ancillary, and pendent-party
jurisdiction under supplemental jurisdiction has alleviated some of the
burden on courts to decipher between these claims.3 o Nevertheless, circuit
courts remain divided on the issue of whether permissive counterclaims can
be heard under the court's supplemental jurisdiction, while it is a generally
accepted principle that compulsory counterclaims must be heard due to the
3
preclusive effect ofresjudicata.
' 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) explains that claims

damages by asserting a counterclaim for monies owed it by plaintiff. See Fletcher, supra note 18,
at 172 (defining defensive set-off). This doctrinal exception was invented at the same time the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, as an exception to the independent jurisdictional
basis requirement of permissive counterclaims. See Ambromovage, 726 F.2d at 988 (discussing
origins of defensive set-off); Fletcher, supra note 18, at 172-73.
28 See Ambromovage, 726 F.2d at 990 (observing Rule 13(a) does not necessarily
"[define]
the outer limits of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction"). Judge Becker, in this decision, opines that
the tests of "common nucleus of operative fact" and "same transaction or occurrence" are not
necessarily dispositive of one another: there may be many separate transactions occurring over a
period of time that share a common nucleus of operative fact. Id. Judge Friendly in his
concurrence in United States v. Heyward Robinson Co., rejects the conventional wisdom that

permissive counterclaims require their own independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction, and
particularly rejects the so-called "set-off' exception. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d at 1088
(Friendly, J., concurring). Judge Friendly posits that exceptions such as this one "[carry] the
seeds of destruction of the supposed general rule" articulated in Gibbs, and in the wake of that
decision many believe that it is proper in certain instances for courts to hear state -law claims
related to the federal claim at issue. Id. However, Judge Friendly does caution against a
snowball effect through a series of permissive counterclaims that would perhaps expand federal
courts' jurisdiction beyond its constitutional scope. Id.
29 See Ambromovage, 726 F.2d at 989 (observing codification of pendent, ancillary, and
pendent party jurisdiction under supplemental jurisdiction); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 18, at §
3523 (discussing the consolidation of pendent, ancillary, and pendent party jurisdiction within
supplemental jurisdiction); see also Perdue, supra note 18, at 543 (opining there is "no
meaningful distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction"); supra note 2 and
accompanying text (discussing supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and court's
discretion to hear such claims).
30 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 18, at § 3523.1 (noting question of whether a claim is
pendent or ancillary is moot today). The United States Supreme Court has since weighed in
stating "[t]he terms of § 1367 do not acknowledge any distinction between pendent jurisdiction
and ... ancillary jurisdiction." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559
(2005). However, this statement was made in the context of a class action lawsuit in which the
plaintiff was seeking to join additional parties who did not meet the amount in controversy
requirement under the court's supplemental jurisdiction. Id. at 549.
31 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 18, § 1420 (distinguishing permissive claims from
compulsory counterclaims as generally not precluded when omitted from pleadings). Compare
Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank v. Therkildsen, 209 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2000) (dismissing

314

SUFFOLKJOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVI

may be heard if they form part of the same Article III case or controversy,
but defining the meaning of that statement has remained elusive.32 In lieu
of this lack of a definitive standard some courts are now taking the view
that "same case or controversy" under 1367(a) is broader in scope than the
"transaction or occurrence" standard of 33Rule 13 to justify exercising
jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims.
In Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., the First
Circuit addressed whether jurisdiction was proper where a permissive
counterclaim was related, not to the plaintiff's claim, but to a compulsory

counterclaim and stating permissive counterclaims require "independent basis [for] federal
jurisdiction"), and Iglesias v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 156 F.3d 237, 241 (1st Cir. 1998),
superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006), as recognized in Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon
New England, Inc., 603 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting compulsory counterclaims may be heard
under supplemental jurisdiction while permissive counterclaims may not), with Jones v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 207 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding "supplemental jurisdiction ... may
be available for ... permissive counterclaims"), and Channell v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., 89
F.3d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting "'Ja] loose factual connection between the claims' can be
enough") (quoting Ammerman v. Sween, 54 F.3d 423, 424 (7th Cir. 1995), and Campos v. W.
Dental Servs., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (agreeing that supplemental
jurisdiction may extend to permissive counterclaims but nevertheless declining jurisdiction).
32 See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause ofAction, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777,
80204 (2004) (citing Chief Justice Marshall's famous quote regarding "ingredient of the original
cause" to confer jurisdiction); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction
and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 447-50 (1994)

(detailing the historical definitions of "case" and "controversy").
Bellia states that by
"ingredient," Marshall was describing an "essential component of a cause of action," and not
referring to "something that might arise in connection" with it. See Bellia, supra, at 802; see also
C. Douglas Floyd, Three Faces of Supplemental JurisdictionAfter the Demise of United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 60 FLA. L. REV. 277, 290-91 (2008) (agreeing scope of supplemental

jurisdiction is broad but suggesting limitations on rule drafters). But see Richard A. Matasar,
Rediscovering "One ConstitutionalCase ": ProceduralRules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test

for Supplemental Jurisdiction,71 CAL. L. REV. 1399, 1478-79 (1983) (observing supplemental
jurisdiction is very broad and may extend to limits of joinder); Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes
in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 986-88 (1998)

(advocating "liberalized" pleading under Federal Rules and expanded substantive legal rights
from same fact set).
33 See supra note 31 (characterizing Channell, Jones, and Campos decisions as expanding
court's jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims); supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text
(discussing Ambromovage and Heyward-Robinson); see also Floyd, supra note 32, at 291-96

(acknowledging historical transaction or occurrence test, but discussing the trends in these more
recent cases). Floyd deduces that based on previous cases, such as Jones and Channell, there are
three types of claims being brought within the rules of joinder under the court's supplemental
jurisdiction: (1) these are "claims that arise out of the 'same transaction or occurrence' because
they have a 'logical relationship,' (2) claims that fail to satisfy that standard but nonetheless have
a 'loose factual connection,' and (3) claims that have no factual relationship at all." Floyd, supra,
at 296. Floyd goes on to argue that these recent Second and Seventh Circuit decisions extend the
scope of Article III to the second category and, in the case of the Second Circuit, it may even
extend to the third. Id.
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counterclaim asserted by the defendant.3 4 The court upheld the district
court's exercise of jurisdiction over this counterclaim stating jurisdiction
was proper "regardless of whether [the claim] is compulsive or
permissive."
The court based this holding on its view that the enactment
of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 "supersedes case law" that had previously made a
distinction between permissive and compulsory counterclaims.36 The court
posited that even subsequent to the enactment of § 1367, prior case law had

embraced the distinction between these types of claims, however, the
Supreme Court had resolved this issue in Exxon Mobil Corporation v.
Allapattah Services.3
In so holding, the court embraced the view of the Second and
Seventh Circuits that supplemental jurisdiction extends to claims forming
part of the same Article III case or controversy.38
While the court

34 See Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 603 F.3d 71, 85 (1st Cir. 2010)

(describing appellant's argument as to why jurisdiction was improper).
35 Id. (emphasis added) (stating court's holding regarding count three of Verizon's
counterclaims). The court elucidates that this is the first time the issue of statutory supplemental
jurisdiction has been addressed in the First Circuit, as all of the court's previous decisions
involving supplemental jurisdiction were predicated on case law and prior to the enactment of 28
U.S.C. § 1367. Id. at 85-86.
36 Id. at 87 (observing statute does not distinguish between permissive and
compulsory
claims).
37 Id.; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005). The court also
cites previous First Circuit decisions such as AfcCaffrey and Iglesias, which required permissive
counterclaims to have their own independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Global Naps,
Inc., 603 F.3d at 86 n.18. The court noted that the AfcCaffrey decision was handed down in the
First Circuit prior to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and it adopted the view that permissive
counterclaims required their own independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See supra
note 27 and accompanying text (discussing AfcCaffrey and other decisions concerning permissive
counterclaims); see also McCaffrey v. Rex Motor Transp., Inc., 672 F.2d 246, 248 (1st Cir.
1982), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon
New England, Inc., 603 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Permissive counterclaims may not be
entertained under a federal court's ancillary jurisdiction unless there is some independent
jurisdictional base such as a federal question upon which federal jurisdiction may be . . .
founded." (citation omitted)). The Global NAPs court explains that the Iglesias decision, handed
down after § 1367 was enacted, incorporated the judge-made distinctions between pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court had clarified in Allapattah. See Global NAPs,
Inc., 603 F.3d at 86 n.18 (noting issue will be reconsidered given the holding of the Supreme
Court). The court's reasoning relies heavily on language in the Supreme Court's decision in
Allapattah, which stated that "nothing in § 1367 indicates a congressional intent to recognize,
preserve, or create some meaningful, substantive distinction between . . . pendent and ancillary
Uurisdiction]." See id. at 87 (quotingAllapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. at 559).
38 Global NAPs, Inc., 603 F.3d at 87 (noting the Second and Seventh
circuits as well as
numerous commentators have adopted this view). The court cites two decisions, Jones and
Channell of the Second and Seventh Circuits respectively, that have already adopted this broader
interpretation of supplemental jurisdiction. See id.; Matasar supra note 32, at 1479 (extending
supplemental jurisdiction to the limits of joinder); Molot supra note 32, at 986-88 (advocating
same); supra note 31 (comparing these decisions with others upholding the independent basis

316

SUFFOLKJOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVI

recognizes there is much debate over the meaning of the terms "case" and
"controversy," it stops short of defining these terms, stating the Article III
standard is broader than the "same transaction or occurrence test."'9 The
court notes that the Supreme Court never endorsed the "same transaction or
occurrence test," and opines all that is required under Gibbs is that the
claims "ar[i]se from a 'common nucleus of operative fact."' 40 Based on the
court's expanded view of supplemental jurisdiction, it finds that § 1367(a)
is applicable and that the alter-ego claim was "sufficiently related to the
underlying litigation" so that jurisdiction under the statute was proper. 41
Similarly, the court concludes that while § 1367(c) provides discretionary
factors for courts to consider before exercising jurisdiction over a
supplemental claim, the district court did not abuse its discretion in this
42
instance.

requirement for permissive counterclaims); supra note 33 and accompanying text (articulating the
various tests commentators have suggested in the wake of cases like Channell and Jones).
Nevertheless, Jones and Channell were decided in the context of comparing the defendant's
counterclaim to the plaintiff's claim to determine whether they formed part of the same Article III
case or controversy. See Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 214 (2d Cir. 2004)
(noting Ford's state law counterclaim was sufficiently related to plaintiff's ECOA claim);
Channell v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs. Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 384 (7th Cir. 1996) (comparing Citicorp's
state-law counterclaims to plaintiff class' claims).
39 See Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 603 F.3d 71, 87-88 (1st Cir.
2010)

(highlighting debate around "case" and "controversy"); see supra note 32 and accompanying text
(outlining debate regarding definition of Article III case or controversy). The court states all that
is necessary in the present case is to "decide that supplemental jurisdiction is somewhat broader
than the transaction-or-occurrence test." Global NAPs, Inc., 603 F.3d at 88. Additionally, the
court notes that jurisdiction over other parties in these instances can be even more complicated
but states "those nuances are not relevant in this case." Id. at 86 n. 19.
40 Global NAPs, Inc., 603 F.3d at 88 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725 (1966)). The court recognizes that other courts have used pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
in conjunction with the same-transaction-or-occurrence test to determine whether jurisdiction was
proper, but it stresses these cases were "never reconciled." Id. at 86; see also supra notes 18-20
(explaining history of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction). In addition, the court explains that
while many courts adopted this narrower formula for determining jurisdiction, other courts
recognized a broader view, such as the Third Circuit in Ambromovage, or Justice Friendly's
concurrence in Heyward-Robinson. See Global NAPs, Inc., 603 F.3d at 86 (citing Ambromovage

v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 988-90 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. HeywardRobinson, 430 F.2d 1077, 1088 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring); see also supra note 28
and accompanying text (explaining Ambromovage and Heyward-Robinson).

41 Global NAPs, Inc., 603 F.3d at 88. In making this determination the court
opines that the
litigation focused on the dispute between the parties regarding what fees were owed each party
under the ICA, and Verizon's alter-ego claim was related to their attempt to collect those fees
from GNAP. Id.
42 Id. at 87-88. The court delineates the discretionary factors under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and
found no abuse of discretion as the "[t]he case had already consumed years of litigation ... the

district court was familiar with .

.

. [the] claims at issue .

.

. [and] thoroughly familiar with

GNAPs' many efforts to avoid [payment] ." Id. at 88-89; see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) ("[P]endent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion .... Its justification
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Based on the long history of jurisprudence and statutory authority
regarding federal supplemental jurisdiction, the First Circuit correctly43
recognized and adopted an expanded view of supplemental jurisdiction.
The court appropriately recognized that statutory supplemental jurisdiction
is broader than prior judge made law regarding pendent, ancillary, and
pendent party jurisdiction.4 4 Because of this realization, it was proper for
the First Circuit to reassess prior cases, such as Iglesias, decided prior to
the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 4' In reversing these previous cases, the
First Circuit properly applied United States Supreme Court decisions like
Allapattah, which held "§ 1367 do[es] not acknowledge any distinction
between pendent jurisdiction and ... ancillary jurisdiction., 46 In addition,
given the highly fact specific nature of the present case, it may have been
appropriate for the court to exercise discretion over count three of
Verizon's counterclaim in the interests of judicial economy, convenience,
and fairness to the litigants.47
Nonetheless, the First Circuit inappropriately, and perhaps
inadvertently, expanded federal supplemental jurisdiction by exercising
jurisdiction over count three of Verizon's counterclaims.48 One need only
look at the text of § 1367(a) to see that the First Circuit has expanded
jurisdiction beyond the intent of the legislature.49 In the present case the
lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not
present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though
bound to apply state law to them."). The Global NAPs court points out that other courts have
upheld the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over alter ego liability claims. Global NAPs,
Inc., 603 F.3d at 88 (citing Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund v. Elite
Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1037 (7th Cir. 2000)).
43 See supra note 19 (discussing Afoore's exercise of jurisdiction over defendant's
counterclaim based on close relation to plaintiffs claim); supra notes 23-25 and accompanying
text (discussing Gibbs formulation and noting discretionary factors); supra note 28 and
accompanying text (noting trend in the courts expanding supplemental jurisdiction).
44 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (noting the codification of pendent,
ancillary, and pendent-party jurisdiction in § 1367); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006) (noting
supplemental jurisdiction extends to claims "form[ing] part of the same case or controversy under
Article III").
45 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (rationalizing court's decision to overturn
prior
case law distinguishing compulsive and permissive counterclaims). The court specifically noted
that there is nothing in the statute that distinguishes these types of claims. See supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
46 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005); supra note 30
(discussing Allapattah decision).
47 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (outlining Verizon's justification for bringing
counts two and three); supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining why it may have been
appropriate for the court to exercise jurisdiction in this instance).
48 See Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 603 F.3d 71, 86 (1st Cir. 2010)
(opining § 1367 applies to all claims forming part of the same Article III case or controversy).
49 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006) (stating additional claims must be related to claims within
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First Circuit specifically stated jurisdiction was proper over count one of
Verizon's counterclaims based on supplemental jurisdiction only and
refused to decide whether the court had original jurisdiction over that
claim.50 Therefore, it would be a violation of § 1367 for the court to
exercise jurisdiction over count three of Verizon's counterclaims, based on
its relation to count one, given that the court did not determine that it had
original jurisdiction over that claim.5'
In addition the court has erroneously disregarded several key
discretionary factors laid out in both § 1367(c), as well as prior case law
and scholarly commentary, in its determination to exercise jurisdiction over
count three.5 2 The text of § 1367(c) specifically enumerates that courts
should refuse to exercise discretion if the state law claims will
predominate, or for "other compelling reasons," however, the court glosses
over this section by concluding, without explaining, that the district court
did not abuse its discretion.53 Expanding the federal court's supplemental
jurisdiction beyond its scope through arbitrary and capricious
determinations of relatedness, as the First Circuit has done here, is exactly
the type of "snowball" effect that Justice Friendly warned about in his
famous concurrence in United States v. Heyward-Robinson Company.' 4

the originaljurisdictionof the court).

[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such originaljurisdiction that they form part of the same

case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added).
50 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (reciting the court's justification for jurisdiction
over count one of Verizon's counterclaims).
51 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing scope of § 1367 and court's
justification for exercising jurisdiction over Verizon's counterclaims).
52 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting complexities of joining additional
parties as not relevant and refusing to define case or controversy); supra notes 30, 31, 37-38
(discussing Jones, Iglesias, Channell, and Allapattah decisions). The court failed to recognize
that these cases were decided regarding the relation of claims or counterclaims to the plaintiff's
claim(s) that were properly in federal court based on original jurisdiction. Supra note 38
(discussing context of the holdings in Jones and Channell). The court also highlighted the debate
surrounding the definition of case and controversy, and subsequently neglected to define these
terms. Supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting Global NAPs court's refusal to define these
terms). The court's statement that joining additional parties is irrelevant to this case is perplexing
given the fact that numerous additional parties were added as a result of the alter ego liability
claim. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (listing additional corporate entities joined as a
result of count three).
53 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (delineating court's reasoning).
54 See 430 F.2d 1077, 1088 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring); supra note 28 (noting
expanding jurisdiction through series of permissive counterclaims could be unconstitutional).
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Similarly, even the commentators the majority relies upon have argued that
there be some limitations on the expansion of federal jurisdiction in the
interests of maintaining the autonomy of state courts. 5 A more appropriate
remedy would have been to limit this decision specifically to the facts of
this case so as to avoid unconstitutionally expanding the court's jurisdiction
beyond the intent of the legislature.56
In Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., the First
Circuit addressed the issue of whether a federal court can properly exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim based on its
relation to another counterclaim asserted by the defendant. Relying on
recent case law in the Second and Seventh Circuits, as well as numerous
commentators' calls for an expanded view of supplemental jurisdiction the
majority held jurisdiction was proper over this claim regardless of whether
it was permissive or compulsory. In addition, according to the court, §
1367 grants federal courts jurisdiction over all claims forming part of the
same Article III case or controversy. The majority's broad view that
statutory supplemental jurisdiction does not distinguish between permissive
and compulsory counterclaims, as well as its conclusion that § 1367 is
broader than the "same transaction or occurrence" test both have merit.
However, the court's misreading of the statute has erroneously expanded
federal courts' jurisdiction beyond its constitutional scope, prior precedent,
and the intent of the legislature. While it may have been appropriate in this
rare instance to exercise jurisdiction over Verizon's counterclaim, the First
Circuit should limit its decision to the facts of this case.
Randall Gleason

55 See supra note 32 (noting divide among commentators concerning expansion of federal
jurisdiction).
56 See supra note 49 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) which requires counterclaims relate to

claims within original jurisdiction).

